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ABSTRACT
This investigation focused on the identification and analyses of factors
that are potentially associated with Controlled Flight Into Terrain
(CFIT) accidents involving air taxi, regional and major carriers. The
study considered 156 fatal CFIT accidents that occurred in the 1988-1994
time frame. Contributory factors related to flight crew, environment,
airport and approach, ATC, aircraft equipment and air carrier
(organisational) have been analysed. Results indicate that Africa and
Latin America are the ICAO regions with the highes CFIT risk for major
operators. Descent and approach phase accidents accounted for around 70%
of the total sample. Almost 60% of the approach accidents involve non-
precision approaches. A high proportion of the accidents occurred in
areas without high terrain. Procedural, situational awareness, tactical
decision making and monitoring/challenging were the dominant crew error
types. The data shows that one-fifth of the accidents involved
inadvertent VFR flight into IMC. One disturbing finding is that 75% of
the accident aircraft were not equipped with a Ground Proximity Warning
System.         
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CONTROLLED FLIGHT INTO TERRAIN (CFIT) ACCIDENTS OF
AIR TAXI, REGIONAL & MAJOR OPERATORS
R. Khatwa and A.L.C. Roelen
National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR), Flight Division,
PO Box 90502,
1006 BM Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Abstract
This investigation focused on the identification and
analyses of factors that are potentially associated with
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) accidents
involving air taxi, regional and major carriers. The
study considered 156 fatal CFIT accidents that
occurred in the 1988-1994 time frame. Contributory
factors related to flight crew, environment, airport and
approach, ATC, aircraft equipment and air carrier
(organisational) have been analysed. Results indicate
that Africa and Latin America are the ICAO regions
with the highest CFIT risk for major operators.
Descent and approach phase accidents accounted for
around 70% of the total sample. Almost 60% of the
approach accidents involved non-precision approaches.
A high proportion of the accidents occurred in areas
without high terrain. Procedural, situational awareness,
tactical decision making and monitoring/challenging
were the dominant crew error types. The data shows
that one-fifth of the accidents involved inadvertent
VFR flight into IMC. One disturbing finding is that
75% of the accident aircraft were not equipped with
a Ground Proximity Warning System.
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Tactical Decision
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1 Introduction
While air travel is undoubtedly one of the safest
means of modem mass transportation, the actual
accident rate has remained approximately constant in
recent years [l]. The challenge is to further reduce
this rate so that the projected increase in air traffic
does not increase the actual number of accidents.
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) remains one of
the leading categories of air carrier accidents [l].
CFIT accidents are those in which an aircraft, under
the control of the crew, is flown into terrain, obstacles
or water, with no prior awareness on the part of the
crew of the impending collision [2].
Since the introduction of the Ground Proximity
Warning System (GPWS), the overall CFIT rate has
decreased [3-51. Other features such as expansion of
ATC radar, enhancement of flight crew training
programmes,improved flight standards, approach
lighting,visual approach guidance and superior
approach procedures may have contributed directly or
indirectly to reducing the CFIT risk. However, these
accidents continue to occur today at an unacceptable
frequency. Pursual of the CFIT problem could provide
an opportunity for safety enhancement.
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Currently, various sectors of the industry are focusing
on means of further reducing the CFIT risk. The most
notable effort is the CFIT Task Force led by the
Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) and International Civil
Aviation Organisation (ICAO). Since 1992, the group
has attempted to improve awareness of CFIT
accidents and established measures to further reduce
the accident rate [6]. Other efforts involve the
development of advanced terrain alerting systems, e.g.
Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System
(EGPWS), Ground Collision Avoidance System.
1.1 Study Objectives
The objective of this study was to identify and
analyse factors that are potentially associated with
CFIT accidents. A more comprehensive account is
presented in Ref. 7. This study was initiated in
association with the FSF CFIT Task Force and the
Netherlands Department of Civil Aviation (RLD).
2 Review of Other CFIT Studies
Although much credible work has been done
previously (e.g.Ref. 2-5, 8-l 8), some of the
references date back more than 20 years and may not
reflect today’s operational environment and current
generation aircraft. Most of the studies referred to
above, although recognising that multiple agents may
contribute to CFIT, have not necessarily conducted a
comprehensive analysis of such factors. Ref. 16 does
present evidence of the development of an appropriate
accident taxonomy.
The recent thrust of industry activities related to CFIT
by organisations such as FSF and ICAO, and the fact
that no recent similar study of CFIT causal factors
(with similar objectives) could be identified, makes
the current study timely and appropriate.
3 Methodology
3.1 Study Approach
The overall approach employed in this study was to:
(a) Identify a sample of CFIT accidents using
world-wide sources;
(b) Identify potential CFIT factors using the accident
data;
(c) Develop an appropriate taxonomy for the
collation and analysis of the information; and
(d) Analyse the gathered information to determine
3.2
what factors and to what degree they were
associated with CFIT accidents in the study
sample.
Data Sources
Searches were conducted using the following
databases/sources:
AirClaims;
AlliedSignal CFIT database;
Australian Bureau of Air Safety Investigation
(BASI);
UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) [19];
Flight International;
Flight Safety Foundation;
CFIT Task Force accident database;
ICAO database;
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [20];
US National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB):
. NLR’s accident database; and
. Netherlands Aviation Safety Board.
Thesesources enabled compilation of a virtually
complete listingof all CFIT accidents of major
ope ators that fulfil the criteria in Section 3.3. CFIT
acci ent data of regional and air taxi operators is not
as easil  accessible. The NTSB database provided a
rath r complete list of US CFIT accidents for regional
and air taxi operators. Those accidents were included
in the sample at the cost of potentially biasing the
sample by overrepresenting accidents to US operators.
3.3
( )
(b)
(c)
(d)
Accident Inclusion Criteria
The accidents involved fixed-wing aircraft;
turbojet, turboprop and piston engined aircraft;
and aircraft in all weight categories.
The accident flights had the following
characteristics:
l engaged in public transport;
l world-wide (no geographical restriction);
l both scheduled and non-scheduled flights;
l freight, passenger and positioning flights; and
l both international and domestic flights.
The accidents occurred during 1988 through
1994.
The accidents resulted in loss of life.
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Excluded were executive/corporate operations, general
aviation, training flights and experimental/test flights.
Application of the above criteria resulted in a sample
of 156 accidents, presented in Appendix A.
3.4 Accident Causal Factor Taxonomy
The accident record suggests that accidents rarely
have a single cause but, instead are the result of a
series of contributory factors. The accident taxonomy
applied herein also attempted to account for multiple
contributory factors. The taxonomy was developed by
using accident reports and other related literature and
consists of 7 main parameter groups:
l basic data;
l flight crew;
l environment;
l airport and approach;
l ATC;
l aircraft equipment; and
l air carrier (organisational).
The basic duru category contains parameters such as
date, local time, flight phase, etc. The resulting
taxonomy, which contains a total of 85 factors, is
presented in Ref. 7.
3.4.1 Definitions
It was difficult to obtain explicit definitions of major,
regional/commuter and air taxi operators that apply
world-wide. The following based on US operations
were loosely applied to categorise operator type.
(a>
(b)
(cl
Maior operator. Have similar characteristics to
carriers currently operating under FARs, Part
121. The aircraft operated generally have more
than 30 seats.
Regional/Commuter.Provide scheduled and
non-scheduled short-haul passenger and freight
services. Typically a wide range of both jetprop
and turbojet aircraft with 19 to 100 seats are
used.
Air taxi. Transport persons, property and mail,
generally using small aircraft (fewer than 30
seats). In the US these carriers operate in
accordance with FARs, Part 135. Much of the
operation is based on an on-demand basis as
opposed to a published flight schedule.
(a> 2
(b) TC
(c> ER
Cd) LD
(e) LH
(0 LA
(ia LG
Take-Off - Initial Climb. From lift-off
until first power reduction or 1500 ft.
Take-Off - Climb Cruise. From end of
initial climb until first en-route altitude.
En-route. From top of climb to
commencement of descent.
Landing - Descent. From top of descent
to 1500 ft.
Landing - Hold. Holding during descent.
Landing - Approach. From 1500 ft to the
runway threshold.
Landing - Go Around.
Flight crew error definitions were derived from Ref.
21. The main goal was to record the number of
accidents in which each error type occurred. Primary
errors are independent of any prior error. The six
primary error types are defined below.
(a)
(b)
Cc)
(4
(4
(0
Communication (CO): Incorrect read-back, he r-
back; failing to provide accurate information;
providing incorrect information.
Navigational (NE): Selecting wrong frequency
for the required radio navigation station:
selecting the wrong radial or heading; misreading
charts.
Procedural (PE): Failing to make required call-
outs, making inaccurate call-outs; not conducting
or completing required checklists or briefs; not
following prescribed checklist procedures; failing
to consult charts or obtain critical information.
Situational awareness (SA): Controlling aircraft
to wrong parameters.
Systems operation (SO): Mishandling engines or
hydraulic, brake, and fuel systems; misreading
and mis-setting instruments; disabling warning
systems.
Tactical decision (TD): Improper decision
making; failing to revise action in response to
signal to do so; failing to heed warnings or alerts
that suggest a revision of action.
In contrast, a secondary error is dependent on another
crew member previously or simultaneously making a
primary error [21].
(g) Monitorinn/challenging (MC): Failing to monitor
and/or challenge faulty action or inaction
(primary error) by another crew member.
The following flight phase definitions are based on
those used by the UK CAA [19] and AirClaims.
-8-
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3.5 Accident Data Coding Protocol
The accident was coded using the values included in
the CFIT taxonomy [7].With the exception of a few
US and European complete accident reports, accident
summaries/narratives were generally employed. The
coding protocol precluded interpretation of the
accident report or narrative to complete the variable
(especially where a subjective judgement could be
applied, e.g. fatigue, improper crew pairing etc.).
Where information was not provided, or was not
complete enough to make an accurate assessment, the
value was coded as ‘unknown’. Some information
may have been lost using this procedure, but it
reduced the risk of a coding bias and ensured
consistency of coding across all accidents.
3.6 Analytical Processes Employed
One of the original desires of this study was to
estimate the risk associated with the various factors
included in the accident taxonomy. T  accomplish
this, an understanding of the underlying prevalence of
those individual factors,system-wide,among
commercial operators not inv lved in accidents is also
essential. These data could then be used to determine
rates for each of the potential risk factors (see Ref.
22). However, much of the non-accident data for
many parameters in the taxonomy were not available.
Unfortunately this meant that risk rates could not be
calculated.
The major steps included in the analysis are il;ted
below.
(a) A digital version of the database was
accomplished, and the data were evaluated
through simple single variable ana ysis. Single
population qualitative data was analysed using
x2 tests.
(b) Next, the relationships among various parameters
were evaluated. For qualitative data, the
comparison of two or more populations and the
analysis of the relationship between two
variables, were facilitated by the use of X’-test of
a contingency table. The tests for quanritative
data involving two or more populations included
t h e  Krusskal-Wallis test for completely
randomised design (i.e. independent samples).
4 Results and Discussion
Unl ss otherwise stated, all percentages are based on
the total sample (N = 1.56). N denotes the number of
valid cases. In the tables that follow, ‘Yes’ denotes
the number of accidents in which a particular factor
was present, and ‘No’ indicates accidents where it was
not a factor.
4.1 Basic Data
4.1.1 Accident Rates
Accident r&es were generally difficult to estimate due
to lack of aircraft movement data. Based on ICAO
movement data of scheduled air traffic [7], CFIT
accident rates per year of majoroperators are
presented in Fig.1. The average CFIT rate (worid-
wide) over the period 19881994 was 0.24 accidents
per million flights.
On average around 4 accidents involved international
operations per year, in contrast to 14 for domestic
operations. Using ICAO movement data [7], the CFIT
ccid nt rate for scheduled international flights of
major operators was estimated as 0.43 accidents per
million flights. This is 3.8 times higher than the rate
for dom stic flights (0.11 accidents per million
flights).
Regional and air taxi operations together accounted
for around 13 accidents on average per annum,
whereas major operators suffered an average of 5
accidents.
4.1.2 Time of Occurrence
Table 1 presents the data when the time of accident is
str tified across operator type.
Table 1 Local Time of Accident (N=87)
Ref. 21 provides time-of-day data for a sample of
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214,000 non-accident flights conducted by major US
operators during 1988. Of those, 13% operated
between 2200 and 05.59, which compares with the
major and regional operators data in Table 1 (15.4%
and 11.1% respectively). However, 29.4% of air taxi
accidents occurred in the same time period. If activity
levels of non-accident flights for air taxi operators are
comparable to those for major operators, then this
finding may suggest that an increased risk is
associated with overnight air taxi operations.
4.1.3 Accident ICAO Region
Fig. 2 presents the distribution of the CFIT accidents
among the major ICAO regions. North America
(NAM) accounts for 34.6% of the total accident
sample - this reflects the accessibility of US accident
data as well as the high commercial aviation activity
level.
Based on ICAO movement data, CFIT accident rates
per region for scheduled flights of major operators are
presented in Fig. 3. Africa has the highest CFIT rate
followed by Latin America and Asia Pacific. North
America and Middle East have the lowest CFIT rates.
4.1.4 Accident Site Relative to Runway
Fig. 4 presents the distance of the aircraft crash
location relative to the runway threshold for accidents
occurring in the approach and landing phase (N = 80).
Almost 60% of those accidents occurred within 5 NM
from the runway threshold, and 90% within 15 NM.
The progressive increase in the number of accidents
with decreasing distance to the runway threshold is
also reported in Ref. 4,9,12.
4.1.5 Phase of Flight
As Fig. 5 shows most accidents occurred in the
landing approach phase (47.7%). followed by 21.9%
in the descent phase - combined total is 69.6%. The
en-route phase accounted for around one-fifth of the
accidents. The difference between the relative
frequencies of occurrence is statistically significant (x’
= 142 and p c 0.01).
Fig. 5 also shows that in those cases for which data
were known, 93% of the en-route accidents were
attributable to air taxi and regional operators. The
majority of aircraft types engaged in such operations
cruise at significantly lower altitudes than those used
by major operators.
Although major and air taxi operators suffered their
greatest losses in the landing-approach phase (61.1%
and 48.9% respectively, p c 0.01) the regional
operators encountered the largest percentage of
accidents in the en-route phase (32.6%, p c 0.01).
4.2Flight Crew Variables
4.2.1 Pilot Flying
Fig. 6 shows the pilot flying (PF) distribution. Data
w re missing in 50% of the sample. Single pilot
operations (SPO) accounted for 30.8% of the sample.
This high number is associated with the large number
of air taxi cases in the accident sample. For operations
where there were at least two crew members, the
Captain was PF (denoted by CAPT in Fig. 6) in 11
(7.1%) cases, whereas the First Officer was PF (FO in
F g. 6) in at least 13 (8.3%) accidents. This difference
is not statistically significant.
4.2.2 Flight Crew Experience
The basic statistics associated with flight crew
experience are shown in Table 2.
Table 2 Flight Crew Experience
EXPERIENCE CAPT. FO
Total hours
Range (hrs) 480- 16000 42.5- I5639
Mean (hrs) 5097 3084
Standard dcv. (hrs) 3707 4220
N 66 13
Hours accident aircraft
Range (hrs) 4-4500 4-l 100
Mean (hrs) IO46 182
Standard dev. (hrs) I134 300
N 52 .I2
Total Instrument hours
Range (hrs) 16-3764 38-389
Mean (hrs) 600 214
Standard dev. (hrs) 839 248
N 37 2
Half the Captains had less than 4000 hrs total
experience (N = 66). In the cases where data were
known (N = I2), more than half the First Officers had
less th n 2000 hrs totalexperience.
In 67% of the accidents, the Captain had less than
1000 hours of experience on rype, whilst more than
42% had fewer than 500 hours (N = 52). For all but
one First Officer, experience on rype was fewer than
500 hours (N = 12).
Where data were available (N=37), 73% of Captain
-lO-
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subjects had fewer than 500 hours of instrlrment flight
time. In one-half the cases these subjects had fewer
than 220 hours instrument time.
4.2.3 Flight Crew Errors
Fig. 7 presents a distribution of the percentage of
accidents in which the flight crew errors occurred.
The monitoring/challenging (MC) error is not
applicable in 48 SPOs. Data were unknown in a high
number of accidents. Nevertheless, the following
observations can be made:
l at least 11 accidents included a communication
(CO) error (7.1%);
l 18 accidents involved a navigational error (NE)
(11.5%);
l 53 involved a procedural error (PE) (34%);
l 70 involved a situational awareness (SA) error
(44.9%);
l 13 included a systems operation (SO) error (8.3%);
l 69 involved a tactical decision (TD) error (44.2%);
and
l 31 involved a monitoring/challenging (MC)
problem (28.7% of the relevant cases).
the en-route phase (Table 4), and this association is
significant at the 95% confidence level.
i
Table 3 VFR into IMC Stratified Across Operators
YES NO
MAJOR 1 20
REGIONAL 13 15
AIR TAXI II 19
I
Table 4 VFR into IMC Stratified Across Flight Phase
PHASE YES NO
Take-Off - Initial Climb 0 3
Take-Off - Climb Cruise 1 2
En-Route 17 5
Landing - Descent 6 I1
Landing - Approach 6 34
Landing - Go-Around 0 4
It is evident that PE, SA, TD and MC are the
dominant error types. Despite the high proportion of
missing data, the percentages quoted above are based
on the total sample. If only those accidents with
available data are considered (i.e. ‘yes’ and ‘no’ in
Fig. 7), then it is evident that the PE, SA, TD and
MC error types occurred in the majority of accidents.
Communication errors appear to be relatively less of
a problem (Fig. 7 indicates that in 37.2% of the
accidents communication errors did not contribute).
Ref. 2 1 reported similar trends for a sample of 37 Part
121 US accidents.
4.3 Aircraft Variables
4.3.1 Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS)
Where data were available (N = 108), in only 27
accide ts was a GPWS fitted aboard the accident
aircraft, i.e. 75% of the aircraft were not fitted with a
GPWS. Twenty two of these GPWSs were aboard
major perator aircraft, one on a regional and none
were on air taxi. Table 5 shows 21 (78%) were early
mark I and II types.
Table 5 GPWS Equipment
4.2.4 VFR Flight into IMC
In 30 cases (19.2% of the total sample) inadvertent
flight from VFR into IMC was a factor. Data was
missing in 67 cases (43%). Twenty one of the 30
accidents involved single pilot operation flights and
this association was significant at the 95% confidence
level. The mean instrument time for the accident
pilots was 611 hours (N = 14).
Most of the accidents (for which data are available,
N= 79) involved regional and air taxi operators (p =
0.006). See Table 3 (‘No’ indicates accidents where
this was not a factor).
Seventeen of the VFR into IMC accidents occurred in
GPWS mark Number
I 12
II 9
III 2
V
Unknown
2
2
Of the 27 GPWS equipped aircraft, 15 (55.6%)
sound d valid alerts prior to the accident, whereas in
9 cases the GPWS did not sound any alert. Six of the
latter accidents occurred on non-precision approaches.
-II-
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Table 6 summarises the crew response to the GPWS
alerts. In only 12 accidents was it known whether the
crew reacted to the GPWS signal. Despite the small
sample, it is remarkable that in 8 of those accidents
there was no crew reaction to the GPWS alert. In the
four accidents where an escape manoeuvre was
initiated, the recovery was non-optimal (e.g. turns,
failure to level wings) and in two of these accidents
the crew response to the GPWS alert was not
instantaneous (Table 6). In some quarters it has been
argued that some of the accident crews had received
little, if any, terrain recovery training.
Table 6 Crew Response to GPWS Alerts
YES NO UNKNOWN
GPWS warning 1 5 9 3
given
Crew initiated 4 8 IS
escape manoeuvre
Crew response on2 2 23
time
Escape 0 4 23
manoeuvre correct
GPWS disabled 1 4 22
by crew
The aircraft were divided into three classes based on
the applicability of current and future (applicable
1999) ICAO GPWS requirements [23]. The
requirements are a function of aircraft weight, number
of passengers carried and date of certificate of
airworthiness (see ICAO Annex 6). They apply only
to international operations. The following definitions
were formulated.
(a) Small - aircraft not required to be equipped with
GPWS in accordance with current or future
ICAO requirements outlined in ICAO Annex 6
and Ref. 23 respectively.
MCTM < 5,700 kg and in future, aircraft that in
addition carry more than 9 passengers.
(b) Medium - aircraft that will be required to be
equipped with GPWS in the future, if engaged in
international operations, but currently not
required to do so.
5,700 kg c MCTM < 15,000 kg. Airplanes less
than MCTM 15,000 kg are currently required to
carry GPWS if they carry more than 30
passengers.
( c )  Large - aircraft that must be equipped with
GPWS in accordance with current ICAO
requirements (and in the future) if engaged in
international operations. MCTM > 15,000 kg.
Applying these definitions to the accident sample
aircraft produces the data in Fig. 8. Data were missing
in only 33 cases. An important issue is the percentage
of accident aircraft that may benefit from the new
ICAO regulations. The ‘small’ aircraft category
ac ounted for 61accidents, whereas the
‘medium/domestic’ and ‘large/domestic’ categories
each accounted for 25 accidents. These latter three
categories will not benefit from the new requirements.
In total 71% of the accident aircraft would not be
required to be fitted with a GPWS in future if the
above weight classification is strictly applied. Note
that some states (e.g. USA) have extended the basic
ICAO regulations to include domestic operations and
this should be taken into account in the interpretation
of the data. The CFIT Task Force has made
recommendations to require the installation of GPWS
for domestic operations [24]. Resolution A3 1-9,
adopted by the 3 1 st Session of the ICAO Assembly in
1995, urges states to take similar action.
4.4 Environment Variables
Ninety three cases (87% of available data, N=107)
involved IMC, compared with 14 accidents in VMC.
Fig. 9 presents the distribution for the light
conditions. In 14 cases where data were known, half
occurr d in dark conditions and 46% in light
onditions. Light condition stratified across basic
weather for 86 cases is shown in Table 7. Whatever
the light condition,IMC prevailed in a high
proportion of the accidents.
Table 7 Light as a Function of Basic Weather
DARK LIGHT DUSK
IMC 33 37 2
VMC 5 9 0
TOTALS  38 46 2
4.5 Airport and Approach Variables
Table 8 provides the distribution of the airport
variables. Only accidents that occurred during the
landing phase of flight (N = 116) are considered.
-12-
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In just over a quarter of the sample, significant terrain
features were present in the vicinity of the airfield,
but in almost 40% there was no high terrain. This
indicates that CFIT accidents do occur in areas
without high terrain. In around a quarter of the cases
approach lights and visual approach guidance (Visual
Approach Slope Indicator System (VASI)/Precision
Approach Path Indicator (PAPI)) were not present,
while there was no Terminal Approach Radar (TAR)
for 37.0% of the accidents. A recent study [22] found
that lack of TAR was associated with a threefold
increase in risk of accidents compared to approaches
conducted with TAR present. In 35% of :he descent
and approach accidents, weather update information
from Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS)
or Meteorology Information for Aircraft in Flight
(VOLMET) was not available.
Table 8 Airport and Approach Variables
_I 26.7 37.9 35.3 II
II ATISNOLMET I 37.1 35.3 I 27.6 II
II Approach Lights 32.71 25.9 I 41.4 II
II VASYPAPI I 36.2 22.4 41.4 II
TAR 31.0 37.0 31.9
Fig. 10 presents the instrument approach aid type dataInform tion on many factors of interest was not
(N = 66, data unknown in 50 accidents). Rates couldavailable. This problem also limited some of the two-
not be estimated due to unavailability of movementfactor analysis that could be conducted (problems
data. Almost 60% of the approaches were non- associated with small numbers). Missing data may
precision. Twenty-five percent (17 cases) of the totalrepresent a serious problem because their influence on
sample wereVOIUDME approaches. Ref. 22the study results is unknown. Missing data resulted in
concluded that the risk of an accident while flying athe study team having to abandon certain planned
non-precision approach is about five times greateranalyses because of the risk of misrepresentation. As
than that associated with flying a precision approachmovement data were unable (see Section 3.6) ‘risk
(world-wide, other factors constant). rates’ could not be estimated.
5 Other Casual Factors - Missing Data
Many of the parameters with a high proportion of
missing data were excluded from the analysis. Several
are mentioned here as they have been reported
elsewhere as important contributory factors to CFIT
accidents. The relevant factor and the number of
accidents in which it was involved are given below.
l 25 accidents - management/organisational
deficiencies.
l 23 accidents - inadequate crew training.
l 9 accidents - visual or physical illusion (black
hole approaches and somatogravic illusions).
l 7 accidents - pairing two crew members with
inappropriate experience levels.
l 5 accidents - fatigue.
l 5 cases - barometric altimeter set incorrectly.
l 4 accidents - FMS/autoflight related.
l 1 case - barometric altimeter was read
incorrectly.
6 Data and Study Limitations
The sample of 156 accidents represent the majority of
fatal CFIT accidents involving commercial aircraft
during the study period, but the small number of
events limited the analysis to simple single- and two-
factor analysis. Application of this simplistic
analytical model to what is acknowledged to be a very
complex event was the only method by which these
data could be evaluated. The greater insight that might
have been gained from multivariable analysis was not
possible.
The accident sample is considered biased as North
American accidents accounted for 34.6% of the total
sample. This is probably because of the accessibility
of US accident data, as well as the high commercial
aviation activity levels. This bias limited some of the
two-factor analyses that could be conducted.
(4
7 Conclusions
Seventy five percent of 108 aircraft for which
data were available, were not fitted with a
GPWS. Three quarters of the GPWS equipped
aircraft (27 in total) were fitted with early mark
I and II types. In 9 cases (on non-precision
approaches) an alert was not generated by the
GPWS. In the majority of 15 accidents with
valid GPWS alerts, flight crew response was
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non-optimal.
A large proportion of the accident sample
(nearly 70%) would not be required to be fitted
with a GPWS if new ICAO regulations are
strictly applied.
Procedural, situational awareness, tactical
decision making and monitoring/challenging
errors were the dominant crew error types,
whereas those related to communication appear
to be relatively less of a problem.
The landing approach and descent phase
accidents accounted for almost 70% of all
accidents, whereas en-route phase accounted for
around 20%. Where data were known, 93% of
the en-route accidents were attributable to air
taxi and regional operators.
Whilst major and air taxi operators suffered their
greatest losses in the landing-approach phase, the
regional operators encountered the largest losses
en-route.
Almost 60% of the 66 approach phase accidents
where data were known involved non-precision
approaches. Twenty five percent (17 cases) of all
approaches were of the VORfDME type.
Almost all (90%) approach and landing phase
accidents occurred within a radius of 15 NM
from the runway threshold.
In almost 40% of the descent and approach
phase accidents, significant terrain features were
absent in the vicinity of the airfield. This
indicates that CFII  accidents also occur in areas
without high terrain.
In 30 accidents (one-fifth of the total sample)
inadvertent VFR flight into IMC was a factor.
Most of these accidents occurred in single-pilot
operation flights, involving regional and air taxi
operators. Seventeen of the 30 (56.7%) VFR into
IMC accidents occurred in the en-route phase.
When the data for scheduled flights of major
operators are considered, Africa appears to be
the region with the highest CFIT rate, followed
by Latin America and Asia Pacific. North
America and the Middle East regions have the
lowest CFIT rates.
For major operators, the CFIT accident rate for
scheduled international flights was 3.8 times
higher than that for scheduled domestic flights.
Eighty seven percent of 107 cases where weather
status was known involved IMC. Around half of
the accidents occurred in conditions of darkness.
The level of analysis detail possible was limited
by the scarcity of data.
(a>
(b)
(cl
(4
(e>
(0
8 Recommendations
All operators should be encouraged to comply
with existing and future ICAO requirements
pertaining to the installation of GPWSs.
Furthermore, the use of GPWS for domestic
operations should be advocated as recommended
by the FSF/ICAO CFIT Task Force.
Inte national support should be given to reducing
the CFIT risk variances among the different
ICAO regions.
CFIT risk-reduction should include not only
major air carriers, but also air taxi and regional
operations.
Any means of reducing flight crew procedural,
tactical decision making, monitoring/challenging
er ors is encouraged. Whether this involves
training and/or improved cockpit discipline, or
other measures such as error-tolerant design of
check-lists and procedures is for further study.
Operators are strongly encouraged to adopt the
CFIT Training Aid, as recommended by the
CFIT Task Force.
Improving terrain situational awareness is
encouraged. In this respect the FSF/ICAO CFIT
Task Force recommends:
l the use of coloured contours to present either
t rrain or minimum flight altitudes on
instrument approach charts;
l technological developments that give to the
flight crew a visual display of the terrain; and
 radio altitude call-out facility to improve crew
awareness of proximity to terrain. Where
altitude call-out is not available, or where
GPWS is not fitted, radio altimeter raw data
can be used to enhance terrain awareness.
The international sharing of accident and
incident data should be encouraged, to facilitate
addressing safety problems quickly and
effectively.
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Irkutsk, USSR
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Ahmedabad, India
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Ilmajoki, Finland
Dayton (OH), USA
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Orange County (CA), USA
Kuala Lumpur. IMalaysia
Altenrhein. Switzerland
Helsinki, Finland
Tcgucigalpa, Honduras
Jacksonville (FL). USA
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08102J89
19lO2i89
19/02/89
23102l89
24lO2J89
25iOU89
22103189
1 O/04/89
19lO4l89
I O/05/89
07106189
I l/06/89
I l/06/89
27107189
3OlO7189
3 l/07/89
Aircraft
B737-200
L-36
Ce42 1
PA-34
B727-200
B727- 1000
PA-3 I
Let 410
DHC7
PA-32
Ce-3 IO
MD-8 I
B707-320
Ce-402
Let 410
An-12
B707-300
F-27
B737-200
PA-60 I
EMB II0
HS 748
Be-200
B707-300
Ce402
B747-200
AC 690
SA-226
DC-7
PA-600
F-27
DHC-2
Be-200
DC-8-62
Be-18
DHC-6
DC-IO
PA-3 I
CV 580
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Date (dmy)
03/08/89
07/08/89
07/08/89
28108189
26109189
28109189
201 I O/89
21/10/89
26/10/89
28/10/89
0111 l/89
OUl l/89
2U1U89
16/O I/90
05/02/90
I4/02/90
I7/02/90
2 l/03/90
28/04/90
30/04/90
04/05/90
I l/05/90
06/06/90
25106190
02/07/90
0 I/08/90
13/08/90
2 l/09/90
14/l 1190
2111 l/90
04/12/90
18/12/90
18/12/90
07/02l9 I
08lO2J9 I
08/02/9 I
05/03/9 I
2910319 I
04/07/9 I
I4/08/9 I
I4/08/9 I
I610819 1
20/08/9 I
I7/09/9 I
2710919 I
16/l 1191
IOIIU91
18lIU91
2010 1192
03/02J92
09lO2l92
2 llOU92
24/02/92
26/02/92
24/03/92
I7104192
22Jo4192
08/06/92
22/06/92
24107192
3 1107/92
Location
Samos, Greece
Nome (AK), USA
Gambella, Ethiopia
Lynchburg (VA), USA
Terrace (BC). Canada
Roma, Australia
Leninakan, USSR
Tegucigalpa, Honduras
Huahen, Taiwan
Molokai (HI), USA
Fort Myers (FL), USA
Apopka (FL), USA
Beluga River (AK), USA
San Jose, Costa Rica
Baker (OR), USA
Bangalore, India
Cold Bay (AK). USA
Tegucigalpa, Honduras
Tamanrasset. Algeria
Moosonee. Canada
Willmington (NC), USA
Cairns, Australia
Altamira, Brazil
Aialak Bay (AK), USA
Asford (WA), USA
Stepanakert, USSR
Cozumel, Mexico
Flagstaff (AZ), USA
Zurich, Switzerland
Samui island, Thailand
Nairobi, Kenya
Evanston (WY). USA
Thompson (UT), USA
Munford (AL). USA
Mirecourt, France
Stansted. UK
Santa Barbara, Venezuela
Homer (AK), USA
El Yopal, Colombia
Uricani, Romania
Gustavus (AK), USA
Imphal, India
Ketchikan (AK), USA
Djibouti, Djibouti
Guadalcanal. Solomon Islands
Destin (FL), USA
Temple Bar (AZ), USA
Albequerque (NM), USA
Strasbourg, France
Serra Do Taquari, Brazil
Kafountine, Senegal
Castle Rock Peak, Australia
Unionville (PA), USA
Morganton (NC), USA
Athens, Grcccc
Hamburg (PA). USA
Maui, (HI), USA
Anniston (AL). USA
Cruzeiro do Sul. Brazil
Ambon. Indonesia
Kathmandu. Nepal
Aircraft Date (dmy) Location
SD 330 27108192
Ce-402 28109192
DHC-6 3 l/10/92
PA-3 1 09/11192
SA-227 19/l 1192
Be-95 19/I 1192
II-76 13/12/92
B727-200 0610 II93
B737-200 13/01193
DHC-6 30/o 1193
PA-60 07/02/93
PA-60 08/02/93
PA-3 1 23/02/93
c-2 12 02/03/93
Ce-402 18103193
A-320 19/03/93
PA-3 1 23103193
L-188 19/05/93
Be-90 05106193
Be-99 I 1106193
Nomad 25106193
Ce-500 01107l93
F-27 26107193
Ce-207 3 1107193
Ce-210 27109193
Yak 40 2511Ol93
AC-I 121 271 IO193
PA-3 I IO/I 1193
DC-g-30 14/11193
DHC-8 20/11/93
B707 01112l93
PA-3 I 30/12/93
Ce-182 I410 I194
PA-3 I I 8/O I194
Be-200 24/O II94
Be-200 23102J94
DC-9-30 09/03/94
Ce-206 06/04/94
DHC-6 25104194
II-18 I3/06/94
PA-32 I8/06/94
8737-200 18/06/94
BN-2 22/06/94
L-100 26106194
DHC-6 I7/07/94
Ce-208 07/08/94
PA-3 I I3/09/94
Cc-210 I8/09/94
A-320 291 IO/94
EMB 110 041 I II94
CV 640 1911 1194
Ce-3 IO 22/l l/94
cc-3 IO IOIIU94
Be-18 17/12/94
B707-300 21112J94
PA-23 291 I u94
Bc-I9
Be-99
8737-200
Viscount
A-3 IO
Ivanovo, Russia
Kathmandu, Nepal
Grand Junction (CO), USA,
Boise (ID), USA
Elk City (ID), USA
Tehachapi (CA), USA
Coma, Zaire
Paris, France
Sellafield, UK
Medan, Malaysia
Iquacu, Brazil
Lima, Peru
Lemont (PA), USA
Oakley (UT), USA
Trijillo, Peru
Dagali, Norway
Cuiabo, Brazil
Medellin. Colombia
El Yopal. Colombia
Young, Australia
Atinues, Namibia
Sorong, Indonesia
Mokpo, Korea
Bharatpur, Nepal
Lansing (MI), USA
Franz Josef Glacier, New Zealand
Namsos, Norway
Sandy Lake, Canada
Urumgui. China
Ohrid, Macedonia
Hibbing (MN), USA
Dijon. France
Sydney. Australia
Kinshasa. Zaire
Altenrhein. Switzerland
Tingo Maria, Peru
Tamworth, Australia
Latacunga. Ecuador
Nangapinoh. Indonesia
Uruapan, Mexico
Pam, Indonesia
Washington DC, USA
Juneau (AK), USA
Abidjan, Ivory Coast
Forte de France, Martinique
Kodiak (AK), USA
Abuja. Nigeria
Tamanrasset, Algeria
Ust-llimsk, Russia
Nabire, Indonesia
Saumcr, France
Bolvovig. Papua N. Guinea
Koyut (AK), USA
Tabubil. Papua N. Guinea
Coventry, UK
Van, Turkey
Aircraft
Tu-134
A-300
PA-42
Ce-210
Ce-207
Ce-172
F-27
DHC-8
EMB 110
SC-7
Be-90
PA-42
Be-18
Ce-402
Be-90
Be-200
EMB 110
B727- 100
DHC-6
PA-3 I
Be-200
F-28
B737-500
Do-228
Be-300
Nomad
DHC-6
HS 748
MD-82
Yak 42
JS-3 I
Bc-90
AC-690
L-24
Cc-425
Yak 40
SA-226
DHC-G
BN-2
SA-226
F-27
L-25
DHC-3
F-27
BN-2
DHC-2
DHC-6
BAC I-11
An-12
DHC-6
UC-90
BN-2
cc-402
DHC-6
8737-200
B737-400
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